Peace and Conflict Studies - Spring 2014

Peace and Conflict Studies Volume 21, Number 1 92 dyad. Thus, my final equation on militarized interstate disputes of developing countries is as follows: MID ij t = a + b 1 DEVlow t-1 + b 2 DEMlow t-1 + b 3 LogCAPRATIO ij t + b 4 ALLIANCE ij t + b 5 DEVELOPED t + b 6 MAJOR t + b 7 STATE-AGE t + b 8 Peaceyears t + b 9 Splines + e. Results. Table 1 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis of the probability of a militarized interstate dispute in a developing-state dyad. To start with the control variables, all but the developed-state variable have statistically significant effects on the relations within a developing-state dyad. Whereas formal dyadic alliances of developing states and increasing power discrepancy in a developing-state dyad were found to decrease the likelihood of a MID, inclusion of a major power or an older state in a developing-state dyad was found to increase the likelihood of a dyadic MID. Table I: Logit Estimates of the Probability of a Militarized Interstate Dispute in a Developing- state Dyad, 1951-2000 Variables Coefficient Robust SE Democracy low -0.0096 0.0113 Development low -0.0743*** 0.0238 Capability ratio ( log ) -0.1597*** 0.0451 Alliance -0.5023*** 0.1311 Major Power 0.2940* 0.1677 Developed 0.0063 0.2019 State age low 0.0070*** 0.0015 Peaceyears -0.1089*** 0.0272 N 12175 Log likelihood -3108.8653 Wald chi 2 (11) 552.26 Prob>chi 2 0.0000 Pseudo R 2 0.2365 P-values are based on two-tailed significance test. *** p <0.01; ** p <0.05; * p <0.10. Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space. As for the theoretical variables in Table I, development low ’s coefficient had a negative sign and is significant at 99% significance level ( p <.002). However, the effect of