Peace and Conflict Studies - Spring 2014

Peace and Conflict Studies Volume 21, Number 1 31 However, this theory has also received criticism for being dependent on strong links between the education and labour markets, which is often not the case. For example, Urdal (2006) argues that when countries respond to large youth cohorts by expanding access to higher education, this may result in a much larger group of highly educated young people than the labour market is able to absorb. High levels of unemployment among highly educated youth may cause frustration that could lead to grievances and incidence of violence. In fact, Choucri (1974) argues that high unemployment among educated youth is one of the most destabilising forces a state can face. In addition, this theory characterizes ‘greed’ as the main driver of conflict, and has been challenged as overly simplistic and dependent on a rational choice theory of human behaviour (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003). Some authors argue there are other explanations for the mitigating effect of education on conflict that remain to be explored. These range from the values that quality education transmits, the evidence it gives of a government’s ability to provide for its citizens, through to the role it plays in simply keeping young people occupied. Although opinions are divided on the mechanisms by which education and political violence interact, the literature highlights the need for education programming to focus on secondary education for youth in and out of school, the role of technical and vocational education, and the relevance of education to employment opportunities and economic development. Political Theory While the greed and grievance perspectives examine the reasons why youth take up arms, the third approach critically examines the nature of the politics that “prepared the field” (Bates, 2008, p. 131) for conflict. Bates argues that ruling elites in many countries post- independence have been driven by the need to maintain a political power base by concentrating resources on a narrow section of the population, rather than developing policies to provide social goods such as education as a wider benefit for all. Drawing on examples from sub-Saharan Africa, Bates argues that post-independence elections were costly and incumbents preserved their position through the distribution of public goods. As it became too expensive to continue in this manner, ruling elites moved towards an authoritarian regime. Under this system, providing the constituency with public goods, including education, was no longer important. The goal of both incumbents and political opponents alike was to garner the favour of ruling elites, on which their chance of success and being included in the narrowing “private distribution” of material benefits depended. This